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Abstract
In this paper we compare the expressive power of three-valued representation
formats instrumental for vague, incomplete or conflicting information. These
include Boolean valuation pairs of Lawry and Gonzalez-Rodriguez, orthopairs
of sets of variables, Boolean possibility and necessity measures, three-valued
valuations, supervaluations. We make explicit their connections with strong
Kleene logic and with Belnap logic of conflicting information. The formal simi-
larities between 3-valued approaches to vagueness, and formalisms that handle
incomplete information often leads to a confusion between degrees of truth and
degrees of uncertainty. Yet there are important differences that appear at the
interpretive level: while truth-functional logics of vagueness are mathematically
consistent (even if questioned by supervaluationists), the truth-functionality as-
sumption of three-valued calculi for handling incomplete information is much
more problematic, compared to the non-truth-functional approaches based on
Boolean possibility-necessity pairs. This paper contributes to a clarification of
the two situations. In each context (vagueness, or incomplete information),
we also study to what extent operations for merging information items can be
expressed by means of operations on valuation pairs, orthopairs, three-valued
valuations and underlying possibility distributions.
Keywords: Kleene logic, partial models, orthopairs, vagueness, incomplete
information, Belnap logic, supervaluations
1. Introduction
Three-valued logics have been used for different purposes, depending on the
meaning of the third truth-value. Among them, Kleene logic [29] is typically
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assumed to deal with incomplete knowledge, with the third truth-value inter-
preted as unknown. Another possibility is to interpret the additional truth-value
as borderline, as a means of representing borderline cases for vague predicates
[28]. It is then tempting to use Kleene logic as a simple logic of non-Boolean
predicates as done recently by Lawry and Gonzalez-Rodriguez [32]. They in-
troduced a new formalism to handle three-valued vague predicates by means of
upper and lower Boolean valuations. Basic three-valued connectives of conjunc-
tion, disjunction and negation can be expressed by composing Boolean valuation
pairs. Moreover they showed how to recover the connectives of Belnap 4-valued
logic of conflict in terms of Boolean valuation pairs. They also use another
equivalent representation consisting of pairs of subsets of atomic variables, that
are disjoint when they represent Kleene valuations. Lawry and Tang [33] in-
terpret the supervaluation approach to vagueness in terms of general non-truth
functional valuation pairs respecting Boolean tautologies.
However, three-valued valuations also encode Boolean partial models, like
for instance in Kleene logic. Orthopairs of variable sets then represent the sets
of Boolean variables that are known to be true and of those that are known to
be false. The third truth-value then refers to the unknown. The natural gener-
alisation of partial models consists of epistemic sets, understood as non-empty
subsets of interpretations of a Boolean language, representing the information
possessed by an agent, which can be viewed as all-or-nothing possibility distri-
butions [45]. Such possibility distributions generalize to formulas in the form
of possibility and necessity functions [42, 18]. Possibility theory, even in its
all-or-nothing form, is not truth-functional, which explains apparent anomalies
in Kleene logic for handing incomplete information [19]. More recently Lawry
and Dubois [31] proposed operations for merging valuation pairs and study their
expression in terms of three-valued truth-tables, as well as pairs of subsets of
variables.
In this paper, we compare the expressive power of three-valued valuations,
Boolean valuation pairs, and orthopairs for handling vague or incomplete infor-
mation. The aim is to expose the differences between these three representation
tools. In particular, we show that orthopairs are more difficult to handle than
three-valued valuations and Boolean valuation pairs when it comes to evaluating
logical expressions in Kleene logic, even if the three notions are in one-to-one
correspondence. We then study informational orderings and combination rules
for the merging of pieces of information that can be expressed under each format.
Again, some discrepancies are highlighted in the expressive power of the three
representation formats. In contrast with these truth-functional representation
tools, we consider non-truth functional ones, such as possibility-necessity pairs
and supervaluations, respectively used for modeling incomplete information and
vagueness, and show their formal similarities, as well as their differences with
Boolean valuation pairs.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents three differ-
ent ways of encoding three-valued valuations. Section 3 presents two uses of
these representations, for modeling borderline cases of vague predicates, and for
incomplete Boolean information. Section 4 casts them in the setting of possi-
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bility theory. The strong formal similarity between supervaluation pairs and
possibility-necessity pairs is highlighted. Section 5 extends these representa-
tions so as to account for conflict in agreement with Belnap logic. We then
get generalized valuation pairs that can be inconsistent, and general pairs of
subsets of variables that can overlap (on variables for which knowledge is incon-
sistent). The problem of carrying the recursive definitions of consistent pairs
of valuations for logical expressions, to the framework of orthopairs of variables
is discussed in detail in Section 6. Section 7 considers various notions of or-
dering relations between three-valued valuations and various combination rules.
It studies whether they can be encoded in the three formats proposed in this
paper. Finally in Section 8, we check whether these combination operations are
expressible in terms of fusion of general subsets of interpretations.
2. Three-valued valuations
Let A be a finite set of (propositional) variables. We denote by 3 the set
{0, 12 , 1}, equipped with total order 0 < 12 < 1, loosely understood as a set of
truth-values with 0 and 1 respectively referring to true and false.
Definition 2.1. A three-valued valuation is a mapping τ : A → 3.
We denote by 3A the set of three-valued valuations. A remarkable subset of
3A is made of Boolean valuations (or interpretations), i.e. mappings w : A →
{0, 1}; we denote by Ω = {0, 1}A the set of all such valuations.
There are two alternative representations of three-valued valuations: or-
thopairs, and ordered pairs of Boolean valuations that we introduce, in this
section, along with their extensions to logical expressions in Kleene logic.
2.1. Representations of three-valued valuations
Definition 2.2. By an orthopair, we mean a pair (P,N) of disjoint subsets of
variables: P,N ⊆ A and P ∩N = ∅.
A three-valued valuation τ : A → 3 induces an orthopair as follows: a ∈ P
if τ(a) = 1, a ∈ N if τ(a) = 0. So P and N stand for positive and negative,
respectively. Conversely, given an orthopair (P,N) we can define the following
three-valued function:
τ(a) =

0 a ∈ N
1 a ∈ P
1
2 otherwise
There is indeed a bijection between orthopairs and three-valued valuations.
Lawry & Gonzalez-Rodriguez [32] propose yet another representation of
ternary valuations τ by means of consistent Boolean valuation pairs:
Definition 2.3. A consistent Boolean valuation pair (BVP) is a pair ~v =
(v, v) ∈ Ω2 of Boolean valuations on {0, 1}, such that v ≤ v holds. v is called a
lower Boolean valuation, and v is an upper Boolean valuation.
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τ ∈ 3A //

(v ≤ v)oo
zzttt
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(P,N)
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Figure 1: Bijection among three-valued functions τ , orthopairs (P,N) and pairs of Boolean
functions v ≤ v.
u 0 12 1
0 0 0 0
1
2 0
1
2
1
2
1 0 12 1
Table 1: Kleene strong conjunction u
A three-valued valuation induces a consistent BVP as follows. For variables
a ∈ A:
• if τ(a) = 1 then v(a) = v(a) = 1;
• if τ(a) = 0 then v(a) = v(a) = 0;
• if τ(a) = 12 then v(a) = 0, v(a) = 1.
Clearly the property v ≤ v holds. There is also a one-to-one correspondence
between consistent BVP’s such that v ≤ v and orthopairs (P,N) defining P =
{a ∈ A : v(a) = v(a) = 1}, N = {a ∈ A : v(a) = v(a) = 0}, and v(a) =
0, v(a) = 1 if a 6∈ P ∪N . Obviously, τ(a) = v(a)+v(a)2 .
So, in the case where v ≤ v there are bijections between three-valued func-
tions, orthopairs and consistent BVP’s as pictured in Fig.1.
2.2. Kleene logic expressions
In this paper we focus on the simplest three-valued logic known as Kleene
logic [29]. It uses two connectives: an idempotent conjunction u and the in-
volutive negation ′. Based on these connectives, we can construct a language
LK recursively generated by: a ∈ LK , φ′ ∈ LK , φ u ψ ∈ LK . Connectives are
defined truth-functionally, as follows (see also Table 1):
• 0′ = 1, 1′ = 0, 12
′ = 12 , which reads τ(φ
′) = 1− τ(φ).
• τ(φ u ψ) = min(τ(φ), τ(ψ))
The corresponding disjunction is φ unionsq ψ that stands for (φ′ u ψ′)′ such that
τ(φ unionsq ψ) = max(τ(φ), τ(ψ)) = τ((φ′ u ψ′)′).
This language defines a class of three-valued functions whose expressions are
the same as those of Boolean logic, but for the possibility of simplifying terms
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of the form aunionsq a′ and au a′. Remarkably, there is no tautology in Kleene logic,
that is, no constant function f : 3A → 3 taking the value {1} that can be
expressed in the Kleene logic language. In fact any proposition in Kleene logic
takes value 12 if all its variables take value
1
2 .
Upper and lower Boolean valuations can be extended to formulas φ built
from variables and Kleene connectives ′,u,unionsq:
v(φ′) =1− v(φ); (1)
v(φ u ψ) = min(v(φ), v(ψ)); v(φ u ψ) = min(v(φ), v(ψ)); (2)
v(φ unionsq ψ) = max(v(φ), v(ψ)); v(φ unionsq ψ) = max(v(φ), v(ψ)); (3)
In terms of orthopairs corresponds on orthopairs to a swapping operation:
(P,N)′ := (N,P ).
It can be checked that if τ(φ) is computed by means of Kleene truth tables and
the pair (v, v) is computed by the above identities,
• if τ(φ) = 1 then v(φ) = v(φ) = 1;
• if τ(φ) = 0 then v(φ) = v(φ) = 0;
• if τ(φ) = 12 then v(φ) = 0, v(φ) = 1;
It can be shown by induction that the three-valued valuation τ as can be
defined as an arithmetic mean of v, v for all expressions in Kleene logic:
Proposition 2.1. For any formula φ formed using the Kleene connectives it
holds that τ(φ) = v(φ)+v(φ)2 .
Proof. It is easy to check that for atomic propositions τ(a) = v(a)+v(a)2 . By
induction, we get the result, τ(φ′) = v(φ
′)+v(φ′)
2 , (enumerating the possible situ-
ations) and τ(φ u ψ) = min( v(φ)+v(φ)2 , v(ψ)+v(ψ)2 ) = min(v(φ),v(ψ))+min(v(φ),v(ψ))2 .
The question whether the evaluation of Kleene expressions can be obtained
by recursively combining orthopairs is much less obvious and will be addressed
in Section 6. However, we first point out two areas where Kleene logic has been
used.
3. Three-valued logic: vagueness vs. incomplete information
There are two main understandings of Kleene logic: it provides a represen-
tation of borderline cases in the modeling of vagueness, or it may account for
reasoning under incomplete knowledge.
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3.1. Kleene logic as a coarse framework for vague predicates
The existence of borderline cases when evaluating the truth status of propo-
sitions is supposed to be one of the main characteristics of vagueness in lan-
guages [28]. The most elementary representation of vagueness may then assume
variables are three-valued, the third truth value 12 being then interpreted as
borderline. In this approach, each three-valued valuation is a complete model
whereby some variables may be neither true nor false. This is the approach of
Lawry & Gonzalez-Rodriguez [32], who cast this elementary idealized model of
vague propositions in Kleene three-valued logic [29]. Since while 12 means bor-
derline, the truth-values 1 and 0 respectively mean clearly true and clearly false;
the value 12 indicates a situation where a proposition is neither clearly true nor
clearly false. It is patent that the lower valuation v evaluates whether a propo-
sition is clearly true or not, while the upper valuation v evaluates whether a
proposition is at least borderline true or not. In this view, an orthopair (P,N)
is interpreted as follows: P is the set of variables that are clearly true in the sit-
uation under concern, N the set of clearly false ones, and the rest are considered
to be borderline.
The corresponding three-valued set-theory is a very elementary variant of
fuzzy set theory [44] where sets possess central elements and peripheral ones as
first studied, in the scope of linguistics, by Gentilhomme [25]. For instance, in
the scale [0, 250] cm., men heights from 1.80 m. up are considered typical of
tall heights, hence central, while heights between 1.70 to 1.80 m. correspond to
borderline cases of tall. So, the predicate tall may be better described as a three-
valued one than as a Boolean notion, as some persons may be judged neither
clearly tall not clearly not tall (as opposed, e.g. to other clearcut predicates
such as single, see e.g., Table 2). But these persons may as well be judged at
the same time peripherally tall and peripherally not tall, (the weak forms of
opposite predicates overlap) even if not clearly so.
Table 2: Borderline vs. unknown
Name Tall Single
John 1 1
Paul Borderline 1
George 0 Unknown
Ringo 0 0
This elementary modeling of borderline cases is discussed in the book of
Shapiro ([36], page 64). The three-valued setting reflects the open texture of
vague predicates leading to propositions that can go either way. He elaborates
a supervaluationist approach on top of the three-valued setting: the borderline
truth-value is then understood as reflecting the fact that the truth status of the
statement tall(x) is likely to move from true to false and back in conversational
scores. For instance, in Table 2, Paul may alternatively be declared tall and not
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tall, because his height lies between 1.6 and 1.8 meters. Of course, this is just
a coarse idealisation of the vagueness phenomenon, in fact the most elementary
one might think of, since the borderline interval [1.6, 1.8] is questionably over-
precise. The clear-cut boundaries between the borderline area and the truth and
falsity ones may be found counterintuitive. However, it is maybe worth noting
that Sainsbury [35] argues against the introduction of higher order vagueness in
terms of borderline borderlines etc. He says that even if you do such a thing the
important question is which cases are definitely true and which are definitely
false. And, following Shapiro [36], one may consider such precise boundaries as
artefacts of the model, whose aim is solely to expose the presence of borderline
cases in the extension of vague predicates. They do not represent something
significant for the understanding of natural languages. As to the assumption
of truth-functionality of this logic of borderline, while it is not mathematically
inconsistent (it has a well-founded algebraic setting), the adequacy of this as-
sumption is widely questioned by supervaluationists, among others [22]. There
is no point here of engaging in the debate regarding higher-order vagueness and
the limitations of the three-valued logic of borderline to account for the repre-
sentation of vagueness. Our purpose is only to use a very basic representation
of non-Boolean predicates (as advocated by Lawry and colleagues) and contrast
it with the logic of unknown.
3.2. Kleene logic and incomplete information
The original intuition in [29] regarding the interpretation of the third truth-
value 12 corresponds to the idea of unknown instead of borderline. In this sec-
tion, we consider that the third truth-value 12 means unknown, and refers to
the ignorance of the actual Boolean truth values of classical binary proposi-
tional variables. The truth-tables of Kleene logic are then traditionally used to
propagate incomplete knowledge.
In many applications, such as relational databases [11], or logic program-
ming [23], we assume that an agent expresses knowledge only about elementary
Boolean variables. In the database area, the value 12 is called a null value. For
instance, in Table 2, the variable pertaining to the predicate single is Boolean,
but it is not known whether George is single or not. However, the predicate
single is not vague whatsoever. This example explicates the difference between
borderline and unknown.
An orthopair (P,N) then does not have the same meaning as in the pre-
vious Subsection 3.1. Here, P is the set of atomic propositions known to be
true (in the usual sense), and N is the set of atomic propositions known to
be false. Clearly, A\(P ∪ N) represents variables on which the agent has no
knowledge. Note that this is formally the same orthopair as in the previous
section, and it can again be encoded as a three-valued valuation. However, the
intended meanings of orthopairs are quite different: in the vagueness situation,
an orthopair represents complete knowledge about a non-Boolean description,
while here it represents incomplete knowledge about a Boolean proposition in a
standard propositional language L equipped with usual conjunction, disjunction
and negation connectives respectively denoted by ∧,∨,¬.
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In this Boolean language, the orthopair (P,N) corresponds to a conjunc-
tion of literals in A, i.e., ∧a∈P a ∧ ∧a∈N ¬a. At the semantic level, (P,N) is
sometimes called a partial interpretation or partial model. In partial logic [6],
usual satisfiability definitions are applied to partial models instead of Boolean
valuations, which can be questioned [13].
Let the set of Boolean models of a formula φ (that is, the set of Boolean
valuations that make φ true) be denoted by E = [φ]. An orthopair (P,N) viewed
as a partial model corresponds to a non-empty set E(P,N) = [
∧
a∈P a∧
∧
a∈N ¬a]
of Boolean valuations, namely all Boolean interpretations w that complete the
partial model. A Boolean valuation w then corresponds to an orthopair (P, P c),
where P c denotes the complement of P , that partitions the set of propositional
variables; or, equivalently, w is the only model of a maximal conjunction of
literals
∧
a∈Pw a ∧
∧
a6∈Pw ¬a. Boolean valuations that complete an orthopair
(P,N) can be represented by (Pw, P cw) where P ⊆ Pw and N ∩ Pw = ∅. It is
often the case (e.g. in logic programming) that a Boolean valuation w is simply
represented by the subset Pw = {a ∈ A : w(a) = 1} = P of positive literals it
satisfies as per the above expression. It lays bare the one-to-one correspondence
between Ω and 2A.
Now, let us suppose that an agent expresses knowledge by means of positive
literals, P ⊆ A. We can have two attitudes with respect to the other variables
in A\P . First, the open world assumption. In this case nothing is assumed
about A\P . Then the corresponding orthopair is (P, ∅). In contrast, under the
closed world assumption, it is supposed that what is not said to be true is false,
thus N = A\P contains the negative facts. This corresponds to pick-up just a
single valuation (P, P c) among all the possible ones in E(P,∅).
Now let us turn to the use of upper and lower Boolean valuations in this
context. The lower valuation v(a) = 1 means that variable a is known to be
true, the upper valuation v(a) = 0 means that a is known to be false, while the
case where v(a) = 0 and v(a) = 1 corresponds to the case where it is unknown
whether a is true or false. Very naturally, the set {v(a), v(a)} represents the
set of possible (Boolean) truth-values of a, according to the available state of
information. The truth-tables of Kleene logic are thus precisely the set-valued
extensions of the Boolean truth-tables [34, 15], namely:
{v(a ∧ b), v(a ∧ b)} = {w(a ∧ b) : v ≤ w ≤ v}
= {min(v(a), v(b)),min(v(a), v(b))}
{v(a ∨ b), v(a ∨ b)} = {w(a ∨ b) : v ≤ w ≤ v}
= {max(v(a), v(b)),max(v(a), v(b))}
{v(¬a), v(¬a)} = {w(¬a) : v ≤ w ≤ v} = {1− v(a), 1− v(a)}}
However, if used to evaluate the knowledge about the truth or falsity of any
Boolean formula, the recursive application of these definitions becomes coun-
terintuitive in the incomplete information setting. Indeed, using Kleene logic
(or the recursive formulas on the upper and lower Boolean valuations as in the
previous section), one finds that for instance, {v(a∧¬a), v(a∧¬a)} = {0, 1}, if
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τ(a) = 12 . However, under the incomplete information setting, since w(a) can
only be true or false, the truth-value w(a ∧ ¬a) is necessarily 0 (known to be
false). And this can be retrieved directly applying the set-valued calculus to all
formulas φ, namely, by computing
V (φ) = {w(φ) : v(a) ≤ w(a) ≤ v(a),∀a ∈ A},
rather that using the truth-tables for conjunction, and negation recursively. For
instance, ∀v ≤ v, V (a ∧ ¬a) = {0} (and not {1, 0} provided by Kleene truth-
tables) since ∀w,w(a∧¬a) = 0. It suggests that the lack of tautology in Kleene
logic is questionable in the scope of incomplete Boolean information: if variables
are Boolean, tautologies should remain tautologies, even if the truth-value of
some variables is unknown. For instance, from Table 2 we do not know whether
George is single, but it is always true that he is “single or not single”.
So, while there is a one-to-one correspondence between partial models rep-
resenting incomplete information and three-valued valuations (relying on the
bijection between 3 and the set {{0}, {1}, {0, 1}} of non-empty subsets of the
unit interval), Kleene truth-tables improperly apply to the incomplete informa-
tion setting for evaluating the epistemic status of complex Boolean formulae.
To overcome the limited expressiveness of orthopairs when modeling incomplete
information, one needs a more general view of epistemic states and the setting
of possibility theory [42, 18].
4. Non-truth-functional frameworks for incomplete or vague informa-
tion
In this section, we first explicate the limitation of orthopairs in the repre-
sentation of epistemic states, viewing them as Boolean possibility distributions
over the set of classical interpretations. Then we recall Boolean possibility and
necessity measures that we compare to upper and lower Boolean valuations.
We show their close connection with modalities in epistemic logic. Finally, we
show that the theory of supervaluations, that usually applies to the modeling
of vagueness, is formally very close to possibility theory.
4.1. The limited expressiveness of orthopairs for incomplete information
In the following, a non-empty subset of Boolean valuations E ⊆ Ω is called
an epistemic set. It represents an agent’s epistemic state, that is, a state of
information according to which all that is known is that the real world is properly
described by one and only one of the valuations in E. Subsets E(P,N) of Boolean
valuations compatible with a partial model (P,N) are special cases of epistemic
sets.
We can equivalently represent an epistemic set E by a possibility distribution
[45], i.e., a mapping pi : Ω→ {0, 1} of the form
piE(w) =
{
1 if w ∈ E (it means possible)
0 otherwise (impossible)
(4)
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3 Orthopairs Valuation pairs Subsets of Boolean valuations
0 (∅,A) ~0 = (0, 0) {w0} = [∧a∈A¬a]
1
2 (∅, ∅) (0, 1) Ω
1 (A, ∅) ~1 = (1, 1) {w1} = [∧a∈Aa]
undef. undef. undef. ∅
Table 3: Basic epistemic sets representable by orthopairs.
Then, the possibility distribution pi(P,N) of the epistemic set E(P,N) associ-
ated to an orthopair (P,N), that is the set of models of φ =
∧
a∈P a∧
∧
a∈N ¬a
can be factorized as:
pi(P,N)(w) = min(min
a∈P
pia(w),min
a∈N
1− pia(w)) (5)
with convention min∅ = 0 and
pia(w) =
{
1 if a ∈ P
0 otherwise.
The epistemic set E(P,N) is a set of Boolean valuations that takes the form of
a Cartesian product of subsets of {a,¬a}, a ∈ A, what can be called an hyper-
rectangle, by analogy with the Cartesian product of intervals in the real line
Rn. Thus, partial models are viewed as hyper-rectangles in the space {0, 1}n if
there are n variables. In the case of the special orthopair (P, P c), the possibility
distribution pi(P,P c) takes value 1 only for the valuation characterized by P .
Table 3 shows basic epistemic sets that are modelled by orthopairs. Note
that the use of orthopairs highlights the interpretation with all positive literals
and the one with all negative literals, that play no specific role in the more
general possibility theory setting. Moreover, there is no way of representing the
empty set of interpretations (the contradiction) with orthopairs or consistent
valuations.
However we can build a rectangular upper approximation of any non-empty
subset E ⊆ Ω of Boolean interpretations by means of a single partial model
RC(E) = (PE , NE) as follows:
• a ∈ PE iff w(a) = 1,∀w ∈ E,
• a ∈ NE iff w(a) = 0,∀w ∈ E.
The map E 7→ (PE , NE) defines an equivalence relation on possibility distribu-
tions over Ω and E(P,N) = ∪{E : (PE , NE) = (P,N)}. RC(E) can be called
the rectangular closure of E. Note that the rectangular closure of E may even
lose all information contained in E (namely, when RC(E) = Ω, for instance if
E is a disjunction of interpretations having different projections on each atomic
space, e.g. any diagonal of the hyper rectangle Ω).
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In general, a non-empty epistemic set E ⊆ Ω can be represented by a col-
lection of orthopairs, which encodes a disjunction of partial models. To see it,
consider a Boolean formula φ whose set of models is exactly E. Then, put φ in
the disjunctive normal form (as a disjunction of conjunctions of literals). Each
such conjunction can be represented by an orthopair.
Remark 1. We can always represent E by a set of mutually exclusive or-
thopairs. This is because it is always possible to put a disjunction of conjunctions
into a disjunction of mutually exclusive conjuncts, for instance using specific
normal forms (such as binary decision diagrams [7]).
So, the use of Kleene logic to handle incomplete knowledge is subject to
severe limitations in terms of expressiveness, since only a small subfamily of
epistemic sets can be captured by orthopairs. Using orthopairs to represent
incomplete knowledge presupposes that information can only have a bearing on
variables, independently of each other. While in logical representations, vari-
ables are supposed to be logically independent, the use of orthopairs carries this
assumption over to epistemic independence (independence between pieces of
knowledge pertaining to variables). Replacing possibility distributions by prob-
ability distributions, it is similar to assuming stochastic independence between
variables (which is a strong assumption).
4.2. Possibility-Necessity pairs
If the available information takes the form of an epistemic set E, we can
attach to any proposition its possibility and necessity degrees N (φ) and Π(φ)
[19] defined by
Π(φ) =1 if and only if ∃w ∈ E,w |= φ and 0 otherwise; (6)
N (φ) =1 if and only if ∀w ∈ E,w |= φ and 0 otherwise. (7)
N is called a necessity measure and Π a possibility measure. N (φ) = 1 means
that φ is certainly true, and Π(φ) = 1 that φ is possibly true, in the correspond-
ing epistemic state. So, if N (φ) = 0 and Π(φ) = 1, it means that the truth of
φ is unknown in the epistemic state [19]. The set-function Π(φ) (resp. N ) is
an extreme case of numerical possibility measure [45] (resp. necessity measure
[18]).
We can compute the pair (N ,Π) of functions L → {0, 1} induced by the
epistemic set representing an orthopair (P,N) as follows:
• N (φ) = 1 if ∧a∈P a ∧∧a∈N ¬a |= φ and 0 otherwise.
• Π(φ) = 1 if ∧a∈P a ∧∧a∈N ¬a ∧ φ is consistent, and 0 otherwise.
There is an obvious similarity between extended consistent valuation pairs
(v, v) and necessity-possibility pairs (N ,Π), namely the following identities hold:
N (¬φ) =1−Π(φ) and Π(¬φ) = 1−N (φ) (8)
N (θ ∧ ϕ) = min(N (θ),N (ϕ)) (9)
Π(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(Π(θ),Π(ϕ)). (10)
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However there is a difference between them: while v(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(v(θ), v(ϕ))
and v(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(v(θ), v(ϕ)), in general, it only holds that
Π(θ ∧ ϕ) ≤ min(Π(θ),Π(ϕ))
and
N (θ ∨ ϕ) ≥ max(N (θ),N (ϕ)).
In particular, Π(θ∧¬θ) = 0 (non-contradiction law) andN (θ∨¬θ) = 1 (excluded
middle law), thus escaping the anomaly of losing the Boolean tautologies when
information is incomplete. Due to these properties, it is clear that:
Proposition 4.1. If the epistemic set is a partial model encoded by the consis-
tent BVP (v, v) the associated possibility-necessity pairs are recovered as
Π(φ) = max
v≤w≤v
w(φ)
N (φ) = min
v≤w≤v
w(φ)
Proof. v ≤ w ≤ v is equivalent to saying that w is a completion of the partial
model (P,N) encoded by (v, v), i.e. w ∈ E(P,Q).
It is easy to identify logical expressions φ for which extended consistent
BVP’s (v, v) and possibility-necessity pairs (Π, N) differ.
Example 4.1. a ∨ b and a ∨ (¬a ∧ b) are not equivalent propositions under
extended consistent BVP’s. Indeed, consider the orthopair (P,N) = ({b}, ∅).
Since v(b) = v(b) = 1, it is obvious that v(a ∨ b) = v(a ∨ b) = 1 too. For the
other formula, we can proceed as follows:
• v(a) = 1 and v(a) = 0 since a 6∈ P ∪N ;
• v(¬a) = 1 and v(¬a) = 0 likewise;
• v(¬a ∧ b) = min(v(¬a), v(b)) = 1;
• v(¬a ∧ b) = min(v(¬a), v(b)) = 0;
• So v(a ∨ (¬a ∧ b)) = max(v(a), v(¬a ∧ b)) = 1;
• So v(a ∨ (¬a ∧ b)) = max(v(a), v(¬a ∧ b)) = 0;
Note that this result is more easily checked with Kleene truth-tables, since,
with τ(a) = 12 , τ(b) = 1, τ(a unionsq b) = max( 12 , 1) = 1, while τ(a unionsq (a′ u b)) =
max( 12 ,min(
1
2 , 1)) =
1
2 . However, in the Boolean setting the two formulas a ∨ b
and a ∨ (¬a ∧ b) have the same set of models, so N (a ∨ b) = N (a ∨ (¬a ∧ b)),
and Π(a ∨ b) = Π(a ∨ (¬a ∧ b)).
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More generally, given a tautological Boolean formula φ, there exists a con-
sistent BVP (v, v) such that v(φ) = 1, v(φ) = 0 (third truth-value 12 ). In
contrast, for any possibility necessity pair, it holds that N (φ) = Π(φ) = 1.
Conversely, given an inconsistent Boolean formula φ, there exists a consistent
BVP (v, v) such that v(φ) = 1, v(φ) = 0 (third truth-value 12 ). In contrast, for
any possibility necessity pair, it holds that N (φ) = Π(φ) = 0. So there is no
equality between v and Π, nor between v and N . However, a consistent BVP
(v, v) determines a unique possibility-necessity pair: the former determines an
orthopair (P,N) and the induced possibility-necessity pair (Π,N ) is the one
that is induced by the rectangular epistemic set E(P,N).
4.3. Possibility theory and epistemic logic
In fact, necessity-possibility pairs (N ,Π), as witnessed by their characteristic
axioms (8), are also pairs of dual KD modalities, and as such it is legitimate to
connect them to epistemic logic [27]. This connection is made under the form of
a simplified epistemic logic called MEL [2, 3]. It is based on a fragment of the
KD language, with no nesting of modalities and no objective (modality-free)
formulas. In other words, it is a higher-order standard propositional language
with atomic formulas of the form α, where α is any propositional formula of
an underlying standard propositional language. Its axioms are the usual K, D,
and a necessitation axiom for propositional tautologies, on top of propositional
axioms for the modal formulas. Even though one may consider MEL as a
genuine special case of KD or S5, there are differences with the usual epistemic
logic such as S5:
• It cannot distinguish belief from knowledge (true belief) since axiomα→
α cannot be expressed in the MEL language.
• MEL does not deal with introspection: it accounts for partial knowledge
of the epistemic state of an external agent (e.g. the perception of what a
computer knows of believes). However the present paper is not concerned
with introspection either.
• Its semantics is in terms of epistemic sets E 6= ∅, not in terms of acces-
sibility relations (in fact MEL is just a propositional logic, adopting the
language of epistemic logic). Namely a modal formula in MEL is evaluated
on epistemic sets, not on possible worlds.
In [10], we have shown than Kleene logic (and other three-valued logics of un-
known) can be encoded in MEL. We then have to restrict the MEL language
to atomic formulas of the form ` where ` is a literal. It clearly highlights the
limited expressive power of three-valued logics, namely a disjunction of literals
such as a unionsq b′ in Kleene logic (Kleene implication) corresponds to a ∨ ¬b
in MEL, while (a ∨ ¬b) has no counterpart in Kleene logic. In other words,
the sub-logic of MEL accounting for three-valued logics of unknown uses a lan-
guage where only literals are prefixed by modalities, and the semantic account
can be restricted to rectangular epistemic sets corresponding to three-valued
valuations, or equivalently, to orthopairs (P,N).
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Remark 2. A truth-functional pair of two-valued dual functions or modalities
reduces to two standard Boolean valuations [19], while, in the three-valued propo-
sitional setting accommodating borderline cases, such deviant modalities (where
the lower necessity-like valuation distributes over disjunctions) are not trivial.
More general Kleene algebras displaying such deviant modalities are studied in
[8].
4.4. Supervaluations and possibility theory
Supervaluationism, proposed by Fine [22]1, is an alternative model of bor-
derline cases as yielding truth-gaps between clearly true and clearly false. In this
approach the fundamental idea is that variables taking borderline values can be
indifferently assigned any of the clearcut values. Such completions correspond
to a set of admissible Boolean valuations. Then, a sentence is supertrue if it is
true in every admissible valuation and superfalse if it is false in every admissible
valuation. Accordingly, a sentence is borderline, if it is neither supertrue or
superfalse or, in other words, if there are some admissible valuations for which
the sentence is true and other ones for which it is false. Unlike three-valued log-
ics, the supervaluationist approach is non-compositional and it also preserves
Boolean logical equivalences, tautologies and contradictions. For example, even
if propositional variable a and its negation ¬a are both borderline, nonetheless,
the sentences a∨¬a and a∧¬a are always supertrue and superfalse respectively.
This is in contrast to the same scenario in Kleene logic where both sentences
would be allocated a borderline truth-value. This example is a particular case
of what Fine [22] refers to as penumbral connections as corresponding to logi-
cal relations holding between borderline sentences. For instance, given a set of
borderline literals, penumbral connections may result in certain logical combi-
nations of these literals being either clearly true or clearly false. In general, its
advocates argue that the supervaluationist approach is better able to represent
penumbral connections than three-valued logics.
Example 4.2. Consider the following type of penumbral connections related to
the vague predicate Tall of Table 2. Suppose we have an increasing sequence
of heights h1 < h2 < . . . < hn where h1 is classed as being clearly not tall,
whilst hn is clearly tall. All other heights are taken to be borderline cases of
tall. However, despite their borderline classification if we were to learn that
height hi was indeed considered tall we would immediately infer that hj should
be also considered tall for j ≥ i. Now defining propositional variables such that
ai denotes the statement ‘a person of height hi is tall’ for i = 1, . . . , n, then such
penumbral connections can be captured by the epistemic set E = {w2, . . . , wn}
where wi(aj) = 1 if and only if j ≥ i.
In the setting of propositional logic, a natural formalisation of supervalua-
tionism is in terms of (non-truth-functional) lower and upper truth valuations
1In fact the term supervaluation was originally introduced by van Fraassen [39] with regard
to the situation in predicate logic when some terms of the language do not have referents in
a particular interpretation.
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as recently proposed by Lawry and Tang [33]. In this approach a set of admissi-
ble Boolean valuations is identified, and then for any sentence φ ∈ L, the lower
valuation of φ is 1 if and only if φ is true in each of the admissible valuations i.e.
φ is supertrue. Similarly, the upper valuation of φ is 1 if and only if φ is true in
at least one admissible valuation, i.e., φ is not superfalse. This formalisation is
mathematically identical to the Boolean possibility-necessity pairs described in
Subsection 4.2. More specifically,
Proposition 4.2. Let E ⊆ Ω be the set of admissible valuations of the language
L. Consider the necessity and possibility measures defined in equations 6 and
7. Then φ is supertrue if and only if N (φ) = 1 and superfalse if and only if
Π(φ) = 0.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward (see also [14]). So, the Lawry
and Tang supervaluationist lower and upper valuations in the supervaluation
framework then respectively correspond to necessity and possibility measures.
Despite this formal identity between supervaluations and Boolean possibility-
necessity pairs there is none-the-less a subtle interpretational difference between
the two models. Interestingly, this difference is inherently linked to the inter-
pretation of the intermediate value. The notions of conjunctive and disjunctive
sets [41], [20] are fundamental to understanding these two distinct semantics.
A conjunctive set is an conjunction of elements representing the value of a set-
valued property, whereas a disjunctive set is a collection of mutually exclusive
elements, each representing one of a number of possibilities, only one of which
can actually be realised. For example, the set of people who have bought a
lottery ticket is a conjunctive set, whilst the set of people who may possibly
have the winning lottery ticket is a disjunctive set. From this perspective then
the supervaluationist set of admissible valuations is a conjunctive set of Boolean
valuations in the sense that each precisification of the given truth-model is on
a par with another whilst for Boolean possibility-necessity pairs the underlying
epistemic set is a disjunctive set of possible Boolean valuations only one of which
captures the actual precisification. The latter disjunctive view is closer to the
epistemic approach to vagueness, advocated by Williamson [40]. The conjunc-
tive view can actually in turn be interpreted in two ways: supervaluationists
consider that none of the precisifications is appropriate, while plurivaluationists
(like Smith [37]) consider all precisifications are equally good.
4.5. Bounded epistemic sets
Many of the theoretical results concerning supervaluationism can be easily
translated from Lawry and Tang [33] into possibility theory. This translation
highlights the relationship between Boolean possibility theory and Kleene three-
valued logic of borderline. Such relationships are best formulated within the
context of a particular restricted class of epistemic sets defined as follows:
Definition 4.1. An epistemic set E ⊆ Ω is said to be bounded whenever
{wE , wE} ⊆ E where ∀a ∈ A, wE(a) = min{w(a) : w ∈ E} and wE(a) =
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max{w(a) : w ∈ E}.
Notice that an epistemic set E(P,N) induced by an orthopair (P,N) is a
special case of a bounded epistemic set in which wE = v(P,N) and wE = v(P,N),
the consistent BVP (v(P,N), v(P,N)) induced by (P,N). In fact we can view
such states as being bounded and complete since E(P,N) = {w ∈ Ω : v(P,N) ≤
w ≤ v(P,N)). There are, however, many cases of bounded epistemic sets which
cannot be generated in this way.
Example 4.3. A simple example of bounded epistemic set is E = [(a ∧ b) ∨
(¬a ∧ ¬b)], where wE(c) = 0,∀c ∈ A, and wE(c) = 1,∀c ∈ A. However,
E′ = [(¬a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b)] (exclusive or) is not bounded.
Example 4.4. Considering again the penumbral connection of Example 4.2, E
is a bounded epistemic set with wE = wn and wE = w2 so that the correspond-
ing orthopair is (P,N) = ({an}, {a1}). However, the associated epistemic set
E({an},{a1}) includes valuations w for which w(ai ∧ ¬aj) = 1 where j > i, and
hence E ⊂ E({an},{a1}).
Definition 4.2. An entirely positive (resp. entirely negative) sentence is a
sentence generated recursively from the propositional variables (resp. the negated
propositional variables) using only ∧ and ∨. The set of entirely positive (resp.
entirely negative) sentences is denoted by L+ (resp. L−).
Example 4.5. The formulas a1 ∧ (a2 ∨ a3) ∈ L+ and ¬a1 ∧ (¬a2 ∨¬a3) ∈ L−.
Let ΠE and NE denote the Boolean possibility and necessity measures rep-
resenting an epistemic set E as given by equations (7) and (6). We recall the
following results from Lawry and Tang [33]:
Proposition 4.3. Let E be a bounded epistemic set and let E′ = {wE , wE}
then ∀θ ∈ L+ ∪ L−, NE(θ) = NE′(θ) and ΠE(θ) = ΠE′(θ)
Proposition 4.3 shows that for a bounded epistemic set E and for entirely
positive or entirely negative sentences, the necessity and possibility values are
dependent only on the bounding Boolean assignments wE and wE .
Proposition 4.4. Let E be a bounded epistemic set then ∀θ, ϕ ∈ L+ and ∀θ, ϕ ∈
L− it holds that:
NE(θ ∨ ϕ) = max(NE(θ),NE(ϕ)) and ΠE(θ ∧ ϕ) = min(ΠE(θ),ΠE(ϕ))
This result shows that possibility-necessity pairs representing bounded epis-
temic sets are strongly compositional when restricted either to entirely positive
or entirely negative sentences. Indeed for this fragment of the logic they share
the same conjunction and disjunction rules as lower and upper Boolean val-
uations encoding Kleene truth-values. In fact, as the following result shows,
possibility-necessity pairs representing bounded epistemic sets are particularly
related to the consistent BVP generated by the orthopair (P,N) where P =
{a : wE(a) = 1} and N = {a : wE(a) = 0}.
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Proposition 4.5. If E is a bounded epistemic set, then there is a unique ex-
tended consistent BVP ~v = (v, v) such that ∀θ ∈ L+ ∪ L−, NE(θ) = v(θ) and
ΠE(θ) = v(θ), and in general ∀θ ∈ L, v(θ) ≤ NE(θ) ≤ ΠE(θ) ≤ v(θ). Further-
more, ~v = ~v(P,N) where P = {a : wE(a) = 1} and N = {a : wE(a) = 0} or
alternatively ~v = ~vRC(E).
Hence, in an epistemic/partial knowledge setting involving bounded epis-
temic sets, we may think of Kleene valuations (in the form extended consis-
tent BVP’s) as a generally more imprecise approximation of the underlying
possibility-necessity pair (see also [12]), which only agrees with the possibilistic
model when restricted to entirely positive or entirely negative sentences. From
the alternative perspective of truth-gaps or borderline cases induced by inher-
ently vague propositions, the above proposition indicates that Kleene valuations
can always be viewed as a semantic weakening of a strongly related supervalu-
ationist truth-model.
5. Representations for conflicting information
In order to extend the expressive power of orthopairs of sets of variables, we
may wish to relax the condition P ∩ N = ∅. The epistemic understanding of
this license is that if a ∈ P ∩N , it means that there are reasons to believe the
truth of a and reasons to believe a to be false as well. For instance, there may
be agents claiming the truth of a and other agents claiming its falsity. This
approach is akin to the semantics of some paraconsistent logics such as Belnap’s
[4]. Dubois, Konieczny and Prade [16] used such paraconsistent pairs of sets of
variables for the study of a possibilistic logic counterpart of quasi-classical logic
of Besnard and Hunter [5].
5.1. Paraconsistent valuations and Belnap truth-values
We call such pairs of subsets of variables (F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A with F ∩G 6= ∅
paraconsistent. For these pairs, it is clear that E(F,G) = ∅. Another semantics
is necessary for them. We use a set 4 = {0, 1, u, b} of truth-values, where
u stands for unknown (it corresponds to 1/2 in Kleene logic) and b stands
for contradictory (both true and false). A four-valued valuation is a mapping
A → 4 denoted by σ. A pair (F,G) in the paraconsistent case is closely related
to Belnap [4] 4-valued logic, namely, in his terminology:
• If a ∈ F \G then σ(a) = 1: a is asserted but not negated (Belnap truth-
value TRUE).
• If a ∈ G \ F then σ(a) = 0: a is negated but not asserted (Belnap truth-
value FALSE).
• If a ∈ F ∩ G then σ(a) = b: a is both negated and asserted (Belnap
truth-value BOTH).
• If a 6∈ F ∪G then σ(a) = u: a is neither negated nor asserted (has Belnap
truth-value NONE).
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unionsq 0 u b 1
0 0 u b 1
u u u 1 1
b b 1 b 1
1 1 1 1 1
u 0 u b 1
0 0 0 0 0
u 0 u 0 u
b 0 0 b b
1 0 u b 1
Table 4: Belnap disjunction and conjunction
τ ∈ 4A //

(v, v)oo
zzvvv
vv
vv
vv
(F,G)
OO ::
Figure 2: Equivalences for paraconsistent information representation
The epistemic truth set 4 is equipped with a bi-lattice structure [24], namely
there is the truth-ordering < such that 0 < u < 1 and 0 < b < 1; and the infor-
mation ordering (ranging from no information (u) to too much information (b))
such that u < 1 < b and u < 0 < b. The truth-tables are those of Kleene logic for
{0, u, 1} and {0, b, 1} according to the truth ordering, plus u unionsq b = 1, u u b = 0
(see Table 4). The second borderline truth-value b plays the same role as the
first one with respect to 1 and 0.
Four-valued valuations can be captured by general Boolean valuation pairs.
The case where v 6≤ v exactly corresponds to pairs (F,G) of sets of variables such
that F ∩ G 6= ∅, letting F = {a ∈ A : v(a) = 1} and G = {a ∈ A : v(a) = 0}.
We call such pairs (v, v) paraconsistent BVP’s.
Lawry and Gonzalez-Rodriguez [32] have shown that truth-tables corre-
sponding to the inductive definitions (1), (2), (3) of consistent BVP’s over the
language become Belnap 4-valued truth-tables when these inductive definitions
are applied to all BVP’s (v, v) without the restriction v ≥ v. In particular, b
corresponds to the pair (1, 0), and
• buu corresponds to the componentwise Boolean conjunction of (0, 1) and
(1, 0), which is (0, 0), i.e., 0.
• b unionsq u corresponds to the componentwise Boolean disjunction of (0, 1) and
(1, 0), which is (1, 1), i.e., 1.
In this case the diagram of Figure 1 should be updated as on Figure 2. Table 5
completes Table 3, accounting for non-consistent valuation pairs.
Just as for Kleene logic, the truth-functionality of Belnap approach does not
sound very natural in the scope of handling paraconsistent Boolean formulas
other than literals [13].
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3 Generalized pairs Valuation pairs Subsets of Boolean valuations
0 (∅,A) ~0 = (0, 0) {w0} = [∧a∈A¬a]
u (∅, ∅) (0, 1) Ω
1 (A, ∅) ~1 = (1, 1) {w1} = [∧a∈Aa]
b (A,A) (1, 0) ∅
Table 5: Basic epistemic sets representable by general valuation pairs.
5.2. Paraconsistent orthopairs as pairs of consistent ones
A Belnap set-up, justifying his 4 truth-values, is made of several conflict-
ing but internally consistent sources of information about variables. Since
E(F,G) = ∅ for a paraconsistent pair (F,G), one may accordingly represent
such a paraconsistent pair by means of two standard consistent orthopairs of
the form (F,G \ F ) and (F \ G,G) that conflict with each other. They are
pairs of orthopairs (P1, N1), (P2, N2), corresponding to the epistemic states of
two conflicting agents, with P2 ⊆ P1, N1 ⊆ N2, N1 ∩P2 = ∅, P1 ∪N1 = P2 ∪N2.
The corresponding paraconsistent pair is of the form (F,G) = (P1, N2). It
corresponds to two disjoint epistemic sets Ei = E(Pi,Ni), i = 1, 2.
More generally we could reconstruct a paraconsistent pair from any two
orthopairs (P1, N1), (P2, N2) as (F,G) = (P1 ∪ P2, N1 ∪N2) as follows
• If a ∈ (P1 \N2) ∪ (P2 \N1) then a has truth-value 1;
• If a ∈ (N1 \ P2) ∪ (N2 \ P1) then a has truth-value 0;
• If a ∈ (P1 ∩N2) ∪ (P2 ∩N1) then a has truth-value b;
• If a 6∈ P1 ∪N2 ∪ P2 ∪N1 then a has truth-value u.
Letting (P1, N1) = (F,G \ F ) and (P2, N2) = (F \ G,G), we do recover (P1 ∪
P2, N1 ∪N2) = (F,G).
Whether we can define a counterpart to the simplified epistemic logic MEL
using pairs of orthopairs representing conflicting epistemic states is a matter
of further research. However, a modal setting for such a kind of non-truth-
functional approach to Belnap-like paraconsistent reasoning is outlined in [15].
6. Kleene logic connectives and orthopairs
In this section, we check whether Kleene and Belnap logic expressions can
be recursively described in terms of orthopairs of sets of Boolean variables. It
turns out that the restriction to (non-paraconsistent) orthopairs for Kleene logic
is problematic. In the following, the notation (P,N) corresponds to genuine
orthopairs, while we use (F,G) in the general case.
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6.1. Semantics of Kleene logic formulas in terms of orthopairs
Lawry and Gonzalez-Rodriguez [32] propose a semantics for both Belnap
four-valued logic and Kleene three-valued logic in terms of pairs of sets of vari-
ables (F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A. However the construction in [32] for Kleene logic
expressions involve paraconsistent pairs. We show here how to express Kleene
valuations over the language in terms of orthopairs only. Let O = {(P,N) ∈
2A×2A : P ∩N = ∅} denote the set of all orthopairs. Then, for Kleene logic, we
can recursively define a pair of dual mappings Tk : L → 2O and Fk : LK → 2O
from sentences to sets of orthopairs as follows:
Definition 6.1. Let Tk : LK → 2O and Fk : LK → 2O be defined recursively
as follows: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LK and ∀a ∈ A then:
• Tk(a) = {(P,N) ∈ O : a ∈ P} and Fk(a) = {(P,N) ∈ O : a ∈ N}
• Tk(θ u ϕ) = Tk(θ) ∩ Tk(ϕ) and Fk(θ u ϕ) = Fk(θ) ∪ Fk(ϕ)
• Tk(θ unionsq ϕ) = Tk(θ) ∪ Tk(ϕ) and Fk(θ unionsq ϕ) = Fk(θ) ∩ Fk(ϕ)
• Tk(θ′) = Fk(θ) and Fk(θ′) = Tk(θ)
The following proposition shows that for any sentence θ ∈ LK , Tk(θ) exactly
identifies those orthopairs for which θ is clearly true given the corresponding
Kleene valuation. Similarly, Fk(θ) is the set of orthopairs for which θ is clearly
false given the associated valuation.
Proposition 6.1. ∀Ψ ∈ LK , Tk(Ψ) = {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(Ψ) = 1} and
Fk(Ψ) = {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(Ψ) = 0}
Proof. Let L0K = A and for n ≥ 1 let LnK = Ln−1K ∪{θuϕ, θunionsqϕ, θ′ : θ, ϕ ∈ Ln−1K }.
Now by induction on n: Suppose Ψ = ai ∈ A then v(P,N)(ai) = 1 iff ai ∈ P
and v(P,N)(ai) = 0 iff v(P,N)(¬ai) = 1 iff ai ∈ N as required. Now suppose the
result holds for LnK and let Ψ ∈ Ln+1K then either Ψ ∈ LnK , in which case the
result holds trivially, or one of the following holds: For θ, ϕ ∈ LnK either:
• Ψ = θ u ϕ: In this case we have by definition that
Tk(Ψ) = Tk(θ u ϕ) = Tk(θ) ∩ Tk(ϕ) = (inductive hypothesis)
{(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ) = 1} ∩ {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(ϕ) = 1}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ) = 1 and v(P,N)(ϕ) = 1}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : min(v(P,N)(θ), v(P,N)(ϕ)) = 1}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ u ϕ) = 1}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(Ψ) = 1} as required.
Also, Fk(Ψ) = Fk(θ u ϕ) = Fk(θ) ∪ Fk(ϕ) =(by the inductive hypothesis)
{(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ) = 0} ∪ {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(ϕ) = 0}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ) = 0 or v(P,N)(ϕ) = 0}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : min(v(P,N)(θ), v(P,N)(ϕ)) = 0}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ u ϕ) = 0}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(Ψ) = 0} as required.
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• Ψ = θ unionsq ϕ: In this case we have that Tk(Ψ) = Tk(θ unionsq ϕ) = Tk(θ) ∪
Tk(ϕ) =(by the inductive hypothesis)
{(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ) = 1} ∪ {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(ϕ) = 1}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ) = 1 or v(P,N)(ϕ) = 1}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : max(v(P,N)(θ), v(P,N)(ϕ)) = 1}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ unionsq ϕ) = 1}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(Ψ) = 1} as required.
Also, Fk(Ψ) = Fk(θ unionsq ϕ) = Fk(θ) ∩ Fk(ϕ) =(by the inductive hypothesis)
{(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ) = 0} ∩ {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(ϕ) = 0}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ) = 0 and v(P,N)(ϕ) = 0}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : max(v(P,N)(θ), v(P,N)(ϕ)) = 0}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ unionsq ϕ) = 0}
= {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(Ψ) = 0} as required.
• Ψ = θ′: In this case we have that Tk(Ψ) = Tk(θ′) = Fk(θ) =(by the
inductive hypothesis){(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ) = 0} = {(P,N) ∈ O :
v(P,N)(θ
′) = 1} = {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(Ψ) = 1} as required. Also,
Fk(Ψ) = Fk(θ′) = Tk(θ) =(by the inductive hypothesis){(P,N) ∈ O :
v(P,N)(θ) = 1} = {(P,N) ∈ O : v(P,N)(θ′) = 0} = {(P,N) ∈ O :
v(P,N)(Ψ) = 0} as required.
Example 6.1. Tk(¬(ai unionsq ¬aj)) = Fk(ai unionsq aj) = Fk(ai) ∩ Fk(¬aj) = Fk(ai) ∩
Tk(aj) = {(P,N) ∈ O : aj ∈ P, ai ∈ N}. Similarly, Fk(¬(ai ∨ ¬aj)) = Tk(ai ∨
¬aj) = Tk(ai)∪Tk(¬aj) = Tk(ai)∪Fk(aj) = {(P,N) ∈ O : ai ∈ P or aj ∈ N}.
6.2. Semantics of Kleene logic formulas in terms of paraconsistent pairs
The characterization of Kleene valuations in terms of orthopairs can be
extended to Belnap valuations by extending the mappings described in the
previous section so as to include paraconsistent pairs of sets. More specifi-
cally, a more general pair of dual mappings can be defined simply by dropping
the restriction to orthopairs in Definition 6.1. Let these extended dual map-
pings be denoted by Tb : LK → 22A×2A and Fb : LK → 22A×2A respectively.
Now it is straightforward to see that Proposition 6.1 extends to paraconsis-
tent pairs. We can show that Tb(θ) = {(F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A : v(F,G)(θ) = 1}
and Fb(θ) = {(F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A : v(F,G)(θ) = 0}. Notice that, unlike the
Kleene mappings given in Definition 6.1, sets Tb(θ) and Fb(θ) are generally not
disjoint, further highlighting the paraconsistent nature of Belnap logic. For in-
stance, ∀a ∈ A, Tb(a) ∩ Fb(a) consists of those paraconsistent pairs (F,G) for
which a ∈ F ∩G.
It turns out that, in this context, we can give independent recursive defini-
tions of each of Tb and Fb. To see this, we need to understand the relationship
between the BVP’s induced by the dual pairs (F,G) and (Gc, F c) as identified
in the following proposition:
Proposition 6.2. ∀(F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A, (v(F,G), v(F,G)) = (v(Gc,F c), v(Gc,F c))
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Proof. For atomic formula the result is straightforward since ∀a ∈ A, v(F,G)(a) =
1 iff a ∈ F iff a 6∈ F c iff v(Gc,F c)(a) = 1, and also v(F,G)(a) = 1 iff a ∈ Gc iff
v(Gc,F c)(a) = 1. These equalities can then be extended to all formula in LK by
recursion on the complexity of formula in LK along similar lines to those in the
proof of Proposition 6.1.
Corollary 6.1. ∀θ ∈ LK , Tb(θ′) = {(F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A : (Gc, F c) ∈ Tb(θ)}c
Proof. ∀θ ∈ LK , Tb(θ′) = {(F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A : v(F,G)(θ′) = 1}
= {(F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A : v(Gc,F c)(θ′) = 1} (by Proposition 6.2)
= {F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A : v(Gc,F c)(θ) = 0} = {F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A : v(Gc,F c)(θ) = 1}c
= {F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A : (Gc, F c) ∈ Tb(θ)}c
As a consequence of Corollary 6.1, it follows that there is an alternative
recursive definition of Tb which does not make direct reference to Fb. This
corresponds to the definition proposed by Lawry and Gonzalez-Rodriguez [32].
Definition 6.2. Alternative Definition of Tb
Let Tb : LK → 22A×2A be defined recursively as follows: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LK and ∀a ∈ A
then:
• Tb(a) = {(F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A : a ∈ F}.
• Tb(θ u ϕ) = Tb(θ) ∩ Tb(ϕ).
• Tb(θ ∨ ϕ) = Tb(θ) ∪ Tb(ϕ).
• Tb(θ′) = {(F,G) ∈ 2A × 2A : (Gc, F c) ∈ Tb(θ)}c.
Notice that a similar alternative definition cannot be given for Tk if we restrict
to orthopairs. The difficulty arises due to the fact that if (P,N) ∈ O and
N 6= P c then (N c, P c) 6∈ O.
Remark 3. It is not clear how to interpret the four-valued framework outlined
above in the scope of modeling vagueness, as the two truth-values other than
true and false play symmetric roles in Belnap logic. In fact, this logic aims at
treating the issue of conflicting information only. [13].
7. Order relations and aggregation operations on orthopairs
In [9] and [31] some order relations and operations on orthopairs are con-
sidered. In our setting, orthopairs are compared in terms of informativeness
or sharpness, or yet positiveness and negativeness. In fact the meaning of the
proposed ordering relations changes according to whether the aim is to model
vagueness in the language or incomplete information. Concerning aggregation
operations, they include Kleene three-valued logic conjunction and disjunction,
plus some which differ from these known ones. They may be used to evaluate
complex non-Boolean statements, or, in the epistemic view, they recover meth-
ods for incomplete information fusion. We give here a complete picture of these
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methods to compare and combine orthopairs, and the corresponding notions
using consistent BVP’s (on the set of propositional variables) and three-valued
functions.
7.1. The truth ordering
First of all, let us consider the standard order on 3: 0 < 12 < 1. Given two
three-valued valuations, τ1, τ2, we can let τ1 t τ2 mean τ1(a) ≤ τ2(a),∀a ∈ A.
In bilattices, this ordering is known as the truth ordering [4]. It expresses
the idea of a three-valued valuation making variables “not more true than”
another one. If τ1, τ2 correspond to respective orthopairs (P1, N1), (P2, N2) and
consistent valuation pairs ~v1, ~v2 then τ1 t τ2 reads on orthopairs as
P1 ⊆ P2, N2 ⊆ N1
On BVP’s, it is the canonical extension of the order 0 < 1 to subsets of {0, 1}:
∀a v1(a) ≤ v2(a) v1(a) ≤ v2(a).
The corresponding join and meet operations induced by this ordering are
well-known (see for instance [9]) and have been met here from the start:
(P1, N1) ut (P2, N2) := (P1 ∩ P2, N1 ∪N2) (11)
(P1, N1) unionsqt (P2, N2) := (P1 ∪ P2, N1 ∩N2) (12)
They are the conjunction and disjunction in Kleene logic (see Table 1), since
ut = u and unionsqt = unionsq.
7.2. The information ordering
Another natural order relation I on orthopairs is:
(P1, N1) I (P2, N2) iff P1 ⊆ P2, N1 ⊆ N2 (13)
This relation is known as the knowledge ordering [4, 43] or, in the setting
of vagueness modeling, semantic precision [31] or sharpening relation [36]. On
valuations, it reads:
~v1 I ~v2 iff ∀a v1(a) ≤ v2(a) v2(a) ≤ v1(a).
Under an epistemic reading, it means ~v2 is at least as informative as ~v1. In the
scope of a logic of vagueness, it means that ~v2 is at least as clear-cut as (or less
fuzzy than) ~v1 (the latter involves more variables taking the borderline value).
Once interpreted on 3, it can be seen that it does not generate a lattice
structure but only the meet-semilattice of Figure 3.
The meet with respect to this order is defined on orthopairs as
(P1, N1) uI (P2, N2) := (P1 ∩ P2, N1 ∩N2) (14)
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Figure 3: The semilattice structure of 3.
It is pessimistic as it only keeps what both orthopairs retain as true or false,
so that (P1, N1)uI (P2, N2) is less informative (epistemic reading) or less sharp
(vagueness) than each of the arguments of the combination. It is akin to the
union of epistemic sets. This fusion operation can be expressed via a connective
uI on consistent BVP’s as follows [31]:
~v1 uI ~v2 = ~v(P1∩P2,N1∩N2) = (min(v1, v2),max(v1, v2))
In terms of truth-values, it corresponds to an idempotent operation minI on 3
such that minI(1, 0) = minI(0, 1) = minI(0, 12 ) = minI(
1
2 , 1) =
1
2 (see Table 6).
Remarkably, minI(x, y) is the median of {x, y, 12}, the only associative operation∗ such that x u y ≤ x ∗ y ≤ x unionsq y, known as a nullnorm [26].
Clearly, the corresponding join can be naturally defined in terms of or-
thopairs as
(P1, N1) unionsqI (P2, N2) := (P1 ∪ P2, N1 ∪N2) (15)
It does not always yield an orthopair as the result may become paraconsistent.
It corresponds to the optimistic combination operator unionsqI on consistent valuation
pairs [31]:
~v1 unionsqI ~v2 = ~v(P1∪P2,N1∪N2) = (max(v1, v2),min(v1, v2)).
where the resulting valuation pairs may fail to be consistent. In terms of
an operation maxI on 3, it is a partially defined idempotent one such that
maxI(0, 12 ) = 0,maxI(
1
2 , 1) = 1, but maxI(0, 1) is undefined. Interestingly, it is
the restriction to {0, 12 , 1} of the (associative) uninorm xyxy+(1−x)(1−y) [26] on
[0, 1], which is indeed undefined for (0, 1) and (1, 0).
It is optimistic as it keeps what at least one orthopair retains as true or false,
so that (P1, N1) unionsqI (P2, N2) is more informative (epistemic reading) or sharper
(vagueness) than each of the arguments of the combination, when it is defined.
It is akin to the consistent intersection of epistemic sets, undefined when empty.
The cases where the result exists then correspond to the situation where the two
orthopairs are logically consistent, that is: P1∩N2 = P2∩N1 = ∅. Generalizing
both orderings to paraconsistent pairs yields a bilattice structure laid bare by
Belnap [4], corresponding to the bilattice 4 (and then maxI(0, 1) = b).
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minI 0 12 1
0 0 12
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 12
1
2 1
maxI 0 12 1
0 0 0 ×
1
2 0
1
2 1
1 × 1 1
Table 6: Information-ordering-based conjunction and disjunction
7.3. One-sided ordering relations
Now, by relaxing the requirements of the information ordering I , we can
obtain two other ordering relations on orthopairs, which generate two lattice
operations. They are one-sided in the sense that the negative and positive
literals do not play the same role. In one case, we keep the inclusion condition
on the negative part of the orthopair and on the positive part in the second
case. These order relations on orthopairs are:
(P1, N1) N (P2, N2) iff N1 ⊆ N2 and P1 ∪N1 ⊆ P2 ∪N2, (16)
(P1, N1) P (P2, N2) iff P1 ⊆ P2, and P1 ∪N1 ⊆ P2 ∪N2, (17)
In fact, (P1, N1) N (P2, N2) means that (P2, N2) is at least as negative as
(P1, N1) and not less informed than the latter and likewise for P , replacing
negative by positive. It can be easily seen that the information ordering I
implies orders N and P but not conversely, but, together, they reconstruct
the information ordering2:
(P1, N1) I (P2, N2) ⇐⇒ (P1, N1) N (P2, N2) and (P1, N1) P (P2, N2).
(18)
Figure 4 represents these three orderings on orthopairs.
Figure 4: Representations of orders N , P and I .
On pairs of valuations the two orders are translated as:
~v1 <N ~v2 iff min(1− v2(a), v2(a)) ≤ min(1− v1(a), v1(a))
and v2(a) ≤ v1(a)
~v1 <P ~v2 iff min(1− v2(a), v2(a)) ≤ min(1− v1(a), v1(a))
and v1(a) ≤ v2(a).
2Condition P1 ∪N1 ⊆ P2 ∪N2 becomes redundant.
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In terms of truth-values, it reads
τ1 ≤N τ2 iff ∀x τ1(x) = 0⇒ τ2(x) = 0 and τ1(x) 6= 12 ⇒ τ2(x) 6= 12
τ1 ≤P τ2 iff ∀x τ1(x) = 1⇒ τ2(x) = 1 and τ1(x) 6= 12 ⇒ τ2(x) 6= 12
the order relations (16) and (17) do not correspond to the standard ordering on
numbers, but are expressed as follows:
τ1 ≤N τ2 iff ∀x τ1(x) ≤N τ2(x) where 12 <N 1 <N 0. (19)
τ1 ≤P τ2 iff ∀x τ1(x) ≤P τ2(x) where 12 <P 0 <P 1. (20)
These two linear orderings on 3 are naturally associated to the following
meet and join operations on orthopairs:
(P1, N1) unionsqN (P2, N2) := (P1\N2 ∪ P2\N1, N1 ∪N2)
(P1, N1) uN (P2, N2) := ((P1 ∩ (P2 ∪N2)) ∪ (P2 ∩ (P1 ∪N1), N1 ∩N2))
(P1, N1) unionsqP (P2, N2) := (P1 ∪ P2, N1\P2 ∪N2\P1)
(P1, N1) uP (P2, N2) := (P1 ∩ P2, (N1 ∩ (P2 ∪N2)) ∪ (N2 ∩ (P1 ∪N1)))
Clearly, the orthopair (P1, N1) unionsqN (P2, N2) is always more negatively balanced
than its operands, while (P1, N1) uN (P2, N2) is less negatively balanced. Like-
wise, (P1, N1)unionsqP (P2, N2) is always more positively balanced than its operands,
while (P1, N1) uP (P2, N2) is less positively balanced.
Proposition 7.1. The two following equivalences hold:
1. (P1, N1) N (P2, N2) if and only if (P1, N1)unionsqN (P2, N2) = (P2, N2) if and
only if (P1, N1) uN (P2, N2) = (P1, N1)
2. (P1, N1) P (P2, N2) if and only if (P1, N1)unionsqP (P2, N2) = (P2, N2) if and
only if (P1, N1) uP (P2, N2) = (P1, N1)
Proof. unionsqN : Let us prove that if N1 ⊆ N2 and N1 ∪ P1 ⊆ N2 ∪ P2 then (P1 \
N2) ∪ (P2 \N1) = P2.
• P c2 ∩ ((P1 \ N2) ∪ (P2 \ N1)) = P c2 ∩ (P1 \ N2) since P c2 ∩ P2 is empty
and P c2 ∩ (P1 \N2) = ∅. Indeed, proceeding by refutation, if there exists
a ∈ P c2 ∩ (P1 \N2) then a 6∈ P2, a 6∈ N2 and a ∈ P1 implies a 6∈ N1, which
violates the condition N1∪P1 ⊆ N2∪P2. Hence (P1\N2)∪(P2\N1) ⊆ P2.
• Now, P2 ∩ ((P1 \ N2) ∪ (P2 \ N1))c = P2 ∩ (P c1 ∪ N2) ∩ (P c2 ∪ N1) = ∅,
since P2 ∩ (P c2 ∪N1) = P2 ∩N1 = ∅. Indeed, N1 ⊆ N2 and (P2, N2) is an
orthopair. So P2 ⊆ (P1 \N2)∪(P2 \N1). Hence (P1 \N2)∪(P2 \N1) = P2.
Conversely, we must prove that if N1 ⊆ N2 and (P1 \N2)∪ (P2 \N1) = P2 then
N1 ∪ P1 ⊆ N2 ∪ P2. Let us suppose that there exists an element a such that
a ∈ N1 ∪ P1 and a 6∈ N2 ∪ P2. Then we have two cases:
• a ∈ N1. However, N1 ⊆ N2 leads immediately to a contradiction.
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maxP 0 12 1
0 0 0 1
1
2 0
1
2 1
1 1 1 1
maxN 0 12 1
0 0 0 0
1
2 0
1
2 1
1 0 1 1
Table 7: Disjunctive and Conjunctive uninorms
minP 0 12 1
0 0 12 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 0 12 1
minN 0 12 1
0 0 12 1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 1 12 1
Table 8: Operations corresponding to uP and uN
• a ∈ P1. Since a 6∈ P2 then a 6∈ (P1 \N2)∪(P2 \N1), which leads to a ∈ N2,
a contradiction.
The other cases can be proved similarly.
Expressed as operations on 3, unionsqN and unionsqP become maxN and maxP dis-
played on Table 7. These operations are not new. They are the only two
everywhere defined uninorms on {0, 12 , 1} (semi-groups with identity 12 [26]);
maxN and maxP also coincide with maxI when the latter is defined. In the
probabilistic literature, the operation maxN is named quasi-conjunction [1] and
we call maxP quasi-disjunction. They are used in the three-valued logic of
conditional events [17] to combine conditionals (which are indeed orthopairs
of examples and counterexamples). Actually, these operations first appear in
Sobocinski’s three-valued logic [38]. On orthopairs, unionsqN looks like a disjunction,
but the truth-table of maxN (right-hand side of Table 7) makes it clear it is a
generalised conjunction.
Expressed as operations on 3, uN and uP become minN and minP displayed
on Table 8. Interestingly, the table of operation minI (Table 6) can be obtained
as the arithmetic mean of the tables of operation minN and minT , which reflects
property (18). We note that uP corresponds to Kleene weak conjunction and
uN to Kleene weak disjunction [29], where the third value is interpreted as
undefined. Again, uN looks like a conjunction on orthopairs and its truth-table
(right-hand side of Table 8) makes it clear it is a generalised disjunction.
If we apply the two meet operations uN ,uP to two orthopairs, one domi-
nating the other in the sense of N or P , then they both reduce to uI .
Let us note that we can express the two conjunctions of orthopairs in the
following way:
uN : ((P1 ∩ P2) ∪ [(P1 ∩N2) ∪ (P2 ∩N1)], N1 ∩N2) (21)
uP : (P1 ∩ P2, (N1 ∩N2) ∪ [(N1 ∩ P2) ∪ (N2 ∩ P1)]) (22)
from which we better understand that we “add” something to the intersection
of positive (resp., negative) parts. The corresponding operations on valuation
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pairs are:
~v1 ∧N ~v2 : (max(min(v1, v2),min(v1, 1− v2),min(v2, 1− v1),max(v1, v2))
(23)
~v1 ∧P ~v2 : (min(v1, v2),min(max(v1, v2),max(v1, 1− v2),max(v2, 1− v1)))
(24)
~v1 ∨N ~v2 = (max(min(v1, v2),min(v2, v1)),min(v1, v2)) (25)
~v1 ∨P ~v2 = (max(v1, v2),min(max(v1, v2),max(v2, v1))) (26)
Thus, orderings P and N are less demanding from the “knowledge” point
of view than the information ordering, but they have the advantage to generate a
lattice structure, with the possibility to define genuine operations of conjunction
and disjunctions on 3.
7.4. Fusion of orthopairs by consensus
Lawry and Dubois [31] also consider a difference operation on orthopairs:
~v1 	 ~v2 := (min(v1, v2),max(v1, v2))
(P1, N1)	 (P2, N2) := (P1\N2, N1\P2)
(τ1 	 τ2)(x) :=

1 τ1 = 1, τ2 6= 0
0 τ1 = 0, τ2 6= 1
1
2 otherwise
It consists in dropping from (P1, N1) the literals that make this partial model
inconsistent with (P2, N2). This can be viewed as a revision operation, or a
prerequisite for a consistent fusion step.
If we consider the so-called consensus operation  in [31], defined as
(P1, N1) (P2, N2) = (P1\N2 ∪ P2\N1, N1\P2 ∪N2\P1)
we can see that it is a sequence of difference operations followed by operation unionsqI
that increases information. The difference operations are used to symmetrically
eliminate the discrepancies between the orthopairs (P1, N1) and (P2, N2) prior
to merging, eliminating conflicting literals. This is akin to variable forgetting
[30] in propositional logic for the handling of inconsistency: the truth-value of
conflicting variables (in (P1 ∩N2) ∪ (P2 ∩N1)) is forgotten. So we have that
(P1, N1) (P2, N2) = ((P1, N1)	 (P2, N2)) unionsqI ((P2, N2)	 (P1, N1)).
We can also relate the consensus operation to the asymmetric relations unionsqN
and unionsqP . Namely it can be checked that:
(P1, N1) (P2, N2) = ((P1, N1) unionsqN (P2, N2)) uI ((P2, N2) unionsqP (P1, N1)). (27)
Thus we can think of interpreting unionsqN and unionsqP as one-sided consensus operations
where in unionsqN both agents give up their conflicts on the positive parts and in unionsqP
on the negative parts of the orthopairs.
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 0 12 1
0 0 0 12
1
2 0
1
2 1
1 12 1 1
Table 9: Consensus operation
3 Orthopairs
0 < 12 < 1 t
1
2 < 1;
1
2 < 0 I
1
2 < 1 < 0 N
1
2 < 0 < 1 P
min(u) ut
max(unionsq) unionsqt
minI(x, y) = med(x, y, 12 ) =
minN (x,y)+minP (x,y)
2 uI
maxI(x, y) = xyxy+(1−x)(1−y) on {0, 12 , 1} unionsqI
x y = maxN (x,y)+maxP (x,y)2 (· unionsqN ·) uI (· unionsqP ·)
Table 10: Mutual translations (maxI(x, y) is not always defined.)
The consensus operation can be expressed in terms of valuation pairs as
(~v1 	 ~v2) unionsqI (~v2 	 ~v1):
~v1  ~v2 = (max(min(v1, v2),min(v1, v2)),min(max(v1, v2)),max(v1, v2))) (28)
On 3 the consensus operator is based on the following three-valued commu-
tative connective:
(τ1  τ2)(x) =

1 if τ1(x) = 1, τ2(x) 6= 0
or τ2(x) = 1, τ1(x) 6=: 0
0 if τ1(x) = 0, τ2(x) 6= 1
or τ2(x) = 0, τ1(x) 6= 1
1
2 otherwise
which is pictured on Table 9. It lays bare the fact that it is a kind of degenerated
qualitative counterpart of an average. It has 12 as an identity and differs from
the conjunctive and disjunctive uninorms only for the result of 1 0 = 0 1 =
1
2 , hence it is not the extension of a Boolean connective. Moreover it is not
associative. It can be obtained as the arithmetic average of the two uninorms
maxP and maxN of Table 7, which is consistent with the abstract construction
of  from unionsqN and unionsqP in equation (27).
Table 10 summarizes the results of this section in terms of mutual translation
of orderings and connectives between 3-valued logic and orthopairs. For consis-
tent BVP’s, not all the above results apply over the whole language, involving
more complex formulas. The problem seems to lie in the formulas containing
negations. However, this issue will need a further in-depth study.
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8. From orthopairs to epistemic sets of interpretations
We now investigate whether it is feasible to translate all the above orderings
and operations so as to express them in terms of comparison and combinations
of Boolean subsets of Ω, i.e., possibility distributions.
8.1. Order relations
The order relation I is just the subsethood relation of 2Ω, i.e., E(P1,N1) I
E(P2,N2) iff E(P2,N2) ⊆ E(P1,N1). In the case of orders t,N ,P , we only get a
partial overlap of the two subsets, which displays no special features. This is due
to the fact that the representation in terms of orthopairs highlights the polarity
of the known variables (positive or negative) while the standard propositional
setting represents an epistemic set by any subset of Boolean interpretations
where positive or negative literals play no specific roles.
Let us consider order N . We have N1 ⊆ N2 and P1 ∪ N1 ⊆ P2 ∪ N2.
So, we can also derive P1 ⊆ P2 ∪ N2. That is, for all p ∈ P1, agent 2 may
believe that w(p) = 1 (like agent 1) or that w(p) = 0 (contrary to agent 1). A
similar explanation can be given in the case of P . Also the case of order t is
similar. This order requires that agent 1 has more knowledge on the negative
part (N2 ⊆ N1) but less on the positive one (P1 ⊆ P2). So, we can have the case
where a valuation belongs to the epistemic set E1 but not to E2 and another
one to the epistemic set E2 but not to E1. So, most of the orderings introduced
previously are dedicated to orthopairs of sets of variables and hardly extend to
the general propositional setting.
8.2. Intersection and Union
Considering the fact that on possibility distributions we can only account
for the order relation I we take into account here only the operations derived
from it: uI and unionsqI . As we have seen, they are the meet and join (when it
exists) on orthopairs. Generally, the join and meet with respect to the subset-
hood relation are the intersection and union of sets, respectively. However,
uI does not correspond to the union between possibility distributions, i.e.,
E(P1,N1)uI(P2,N2) 6= E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2). Indeed E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2) is gener-
ally not rectangular. We can just prove:
Proposition 8.1.
E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2) ⊆ E((P1,N1)uI(P2,N2)).
Proof. We have that (P1 ∩ P2) ⊆ P1 and (N1 ∩N2) ⊆ N1. That is,
(P1, N1) uI (P2, N2) I (P1, N1). So, E(P1,N1) ⊆ E(P1,N1)uI(P2,N2).
Likewise for E(P2,N2). Hence E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2) ⊆ E((P1,N1)uI(P2,N2)).
The other direction does not hold. Indeed, consider the following valu-
ation w∗ characterized by the orthopair (P1 ∩ P2, (P1 ∩ P2)c): then w∗ ∈
E(P1,N1)uI(P2,N2) but w
∗ 6∈ E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2).
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This behaviour is due to the impossibility of representing non rectangular re-
gions by orthopairs. Indeed, we can only represent the smallest hyper-rectangle
which contains E(P1,N1) and E(P2,N2) (the rectangular closure of their union),
which corresponds indeed to E((P1,N1)uI(P2,N2)).
Proposition 8.2. E((P1,N1)uI(P2,N2)) = ×i(ProjiE(P1,N1) ∪ ProjiE(P2,N2)) =
RC(E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2)).
Proof. It is clear that E((P1,N1)uI(P2,N2)) = E(P1∩P2,N1∩N2) contains all the val-
uations w that have value 1 on P1 ∩ P2 and value zero on N1 ∩ N2. Now, if
we consider the Cartesian product of the union of the projections of E(P1,N1)
and E(P2,N2), we have that, for each variable ai, ai must be equal to 1 iff both
E(P1,N1) and E(P2,N2) assume value 1 for a1. This is only possible if ai ∈ P1∩P2.
The same applies to the negative part. Thus, ×i(ProjiE(P1,N1)∪ProjiE(P2,N2))
is the set of all the valuations w that have value 1 on P1 ∩P2 and value zero on
N1 ∩N2.
As pointed out before, the disjunction of two rectangular possibility distribu-
tions is generally not representable by one orthopair, but by several orthopairs,
since it corresponds to the disjunction of two partial models. We can denote
this disjunction of orthopairs as (P1, N1) + (P2, N2) with the meaning that it
refers the set {(P1, N1), (P2, N2)} of orthopairs, and compute the disjunction of
the corresponding partial models:
E((P1,N1)+(P2,N2)) = E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2)
From an interpretive standpoint, we can think that we desire to collect all the
situations where at least one of two agents is right, without specifying which
one. Of course, we cannot express this operation on three-valued functions, since
this operation is not closed: it just collects the two valuations representing the
two orthopairs τ(P1,N1) + τ(P2,N2) = {τ(P1,N1), τ(P2,N2)}. Similarly in the case of
valuations pairs.
If we consider the case of two consistent orthopairs, then the operation unionsqI
is defined, and we have:
Proposition 8.3. If (P1, N1) and (P2, N2) are consistent orthopairs, then
E(P1,N1) ∩ E(P2,N2) = E(P1,N1)unionsqI(P2,N2) = E(P1,N1)(P2,N2).
Proof. Under consistency we have that (P1, N1)unionsqI(P2, N2) = (P1, N1)(P2, N2).
Then, E(P1,N1)unionsqI(P2,N2) = E{(P1∪P2),(N1∪N2)}, the latter being equal by defini-
tion to: {w ∈ Ω : w(p) = 1,∀p ∈ P1 ∪ P2 and w(p) = 0,∀p ∈ N1 ∪N2} = {w ∈
Ω : w(p) = 1,∀p ∈ P1 and w(p) = 1,∀p ∈ P2 and w(p) = 0,∀p ∈ N1 and w(p) =
0,∀p ∈ N2}, from which E(P1,N1) ∩ E(P2,N2) = E(P1,N1)unionsqI(P2,N2) follows.
8.3. Consensus and Difference
By a straightforward application of its definition, we get that the consensus
E(P1,N1)(P2,N2) contains the intersection of the two epistemic subsets E(P1,N1)
and E(P2,N2), and is also contained in E(P1,N1)uI(P2,N2).
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Proposition 8.4.
E(P1,N1) ∩ E(P2,N2) ⊆ E(P1,N1)(P2,N2) ⊆ E(P1,N1)uI(P2,N2).
However, it is incomparable with their union E(P1,N1)∪E(P2,N2), that is there
exists w ∈ E(P1,N1)(P2,N2) such that w 6∈ E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2) and conversely.
Example 8.1. Consider the Boolean valuation w1, corresponding to the or-
thopair (P1\N2 ∪P2\N1, ((P1\N2 ∪P2\N1)c). It belongs to E(P1,N1)(P2,N2) (by
definition) and not to E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2), since it belongs neither to E(P1,N1)
nor to E(P2,N2).
Conversely, the Boolean valuation w2 encoded by ((N1 ∪ (P2\P1))c, N1 ∪
(P2\P1)) = (N c1 ∩ (P c2 ∪P1), N1 ∪ (P2\P1)) belongs to E(P1,N1) ∪E(P2,N2) (since
it lies in E(P1,N1)) and not to E(P1,N1)(P2,N2), since any a ∈ P c1 ∩P c2 ∩N c1 ∩N2
is such that w2(a) = 1 but note that ∀w ∈ E(P1,N1)(P2,N2), w(a) = 0 since
a ∈ (N1\P2) ∪ (N2\P1)) (the negative literals of (P1, N1) (P2, N2)).
Further, by Propositions 8.1 and 8.4 we can derive
E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2) ∪ E((P1,N1)(P2,N2)) ⊆ E(P1,N1)uI(P2,N2).
But not the opposite direction, as can be seen by considering the valuation w∗
above, characterized by the orthopair (P1 ∩ P2, (P1 ∩ P2)c).
If we write (P1, N1) (P2, N2) in terms of unions among orthopairs, namely
(P1, N1)  (P2, N2) = (P1\N2, N1\P2) unionsqI (P2\N1, N2\P1), by Proposition 8.3,
we get
E((P1,N1)(P2,N2)) = E(P1\N2,N1\P2) ∩ E(P2\N1,N2\P1),
which expresses the already outlined relation between consensus and difference.
The latter operation can be expressed in terms of possibility distributions as-
sociated to E(Pi,Ni). Consider an orthopair (P,N) and a valuation w ∈ Ω such
that w 6∈ E(P,N). Then define:
E+w(P,N) = RC(E(P,N) ∪ {w})
Now clearly we get: E+w(P,N) = E(P∩Pw,N∩P cw), where Pw = {a : w(a) = 1}, and
∀w1 6= w2 it holds that E+w1(P,N) ∩ E+w2(P,N) 6= ∅ (it contains E(P,N)).
Proposition 8.5. Let (P1, N1) and (P2, N2) be mutually inconsistent orthopairs
(i.e. E(P1,N1) ∩ E(P2,N2) = ∅). Then
E(P1,N1)	(P2,N2) = E(P1\N2,N1\P2) =
⋂
w∈E(P2,N2)
E+w(P1,N1)
Proof. By proposition 8.3 it follows that:⋂
w∈E(P2,N2)
E+w(P1,N1) =
⋂
w∈E(P2,N2)
E(P1∩Pw,N1∩P cw) = E
F
Iw∈E(P2,N2)
(P1∩Pw,N1∩P cw)
Now,
⊔
Iw∈E(P2,N2)
(P1 ∩ Pw, N1 ∩ P cw) = (P1∩
⋃
w∈E(P2,N2) Pw, N1∩
⋃
w∈E(P2,N2) P
c
w)
= (P1∩{ai : ∃w ∈ E(P2,N2), w(ai) = 1}, N1∩{ai : ∃w ∈ E(P2,N2), w(ai) = 0}) =
(P1 ∩N c2 , N1 ∩ P c2 ) as required.
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Finally, from this proposition it follows that:
E(P1,N1)(P2,N2) = (
⋂
w∈E(P2,N2)
E+w(P1,N1)) ∩ (
⋂
w∈E(P1,N1)
E+w(P2,N2))
8.4. Negations vs. complements
Let us consider now the case of negation. The set of models of the negation
of a Boolean proposition with set of models E is its set complement Ec. For a
partial model (P,N), we get:
(E(P,N))c = {w : ∃p ∈ P,w(p) = 0 or ∃p ∈ N,w(p) = 1}
which is clearly different from the epistemic set we obtain from the Kleene
(involutive) negation of (P,N):
E(P,N)′ = E(N,P )
that swaps positive and negative literals in the orthopair. The latter comes
down to considering the projections of E(P,N) on each variable domain and
complementing them with respect to these variable domains. This operation
cannot be extended to general epistemic sets.
In contrast, the + operation, that concatenates orthopairs (see Subsection
8.2) can express the complement of an epistemic set corresponding to an or-
thopair. Let us define the unary operations E(P,N) = (+pi∈P ({pi}, ∅)) +
(+ni∈N (∅, {ni})), that is, E = {({pi}, ∅), (∅, {ni}) : pi ∈ P, ni ∈ N}. Then:
(E(P,N))c = EE((P,N)′) = (∪pi∈PE(∅,{pi})) ∪ (∪ni∈NE({ni},∅)).
The operation E on three-valued valuations is a multimapping that collects
all the following three-valued valuations E(τ) = {τ+i : pi ∈ P} ∪ {τ+i : ni ∈ N}
where:
τ+i (x) =
{
1 x = pi
1
2 otherwise
or τ−i (x) =
{
0 x = ni
1
2 otherwise
and we can define the 3-valued logic counterpart of the complement of an epis-
temic set as τ c = E(τ ′) = {(τ+i )′ : pi ∈ A, τ(pi) = 1} ∪ {(τ−i )′ : ni ∈ A, τ(ni) =
0}. Likewise on Boolean valuations, we must collect all pairs such that:
(vi(x), vi(x)) =
{
(1, 1) x = pi
(0, 1) otherwise
or (vi(x), vi(x)) =
{
(0, 0) x = ni
(0, 1) otherwise.
Table 11 summarizes these translations that make sense from the language
of orthopairs, three-valued valuations to the language of general epistemic sets.
Not all three-valued connectives can be expressed in terms of general epistemic
sets. The impossibility to express unionsqt and ut, or likewise, unionsqN and uN , unionsqP and
uP in terms of general subsets of valuation comes from the fact that the former
operations do not consider positive and negative literals on a par. Other impossi-
ble direct translations come from the fact that the set-union of hyper-rectangles
of interpretations is generally not an hyper-rectangle, or stated otherwise, that
the disjunction of partial models is not a partial model.
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Orthopairs Epistemic sets
(P1, N1) I (P2, N2) E(P1,N1) ⊇ E(P2,N2)
(P1, N1) uI (P2, N2) RC(E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2))
(P1, N1) unionsqI (P2, N2) E(P1,N1) ∩ E(P2,N2) (if consistency)
(P1, N1) (P2, N2) (
⋂
w∈E(P2,N2) E
+w
(P1,N1)
) ∩ (⋂w∈E(P1,N1) E+w(P2,N2))
(P1, N1)	 (P2, N2) E(P1\N2,N1\P2) =
⋂
w∈E(P2,N2) E
+w
(P1,N1)
(Prop. 8.5)
(P1, N1) + (P2, N2) E(P1,N1) ∪ E(P2,N2)
Kleene negation (P,N)′ ×pi∈V(ProjiE)c
E((P,N)′) Complement Ec(P,N)
Table 11: Translation between epistemic sets and orthopairs
9. Conclusion
The bijection between three-valued valuations and partial models (and, in
the same vein, the similarities between fuzzy sets and probability theory) has
often been a source of confusion, as the truth-functionality assumption of three-
valued logic, which is not mathematically inconsistent in an elementary model-
ing of vagueness, becomes counterintuitive when applied to incomplete Boolean
information. A well-known example of such confusion is the alleged inconsis-
tency of fuzzy set theory, claimed by Elkan [21], on the grounds that degrees of
uncertainty cannot be compositional.
This paper has presented a comparative overview of the simplest represen-
tation frameworks for the truth-functional account of vagueness or incomplete
information, namely three-valued logics where the third truth-value means bor-
derline or unknown. We have shown the connections existing between pairs of
sets of literals, pairs of Boolean valuations, and three-valued valuations. We
have explored their differences with non-truth-functional accounts using pos-
sibility theory or, in the case of vagueness, supervaluations. We have shown
that supervaluations play the same role with respect to truth-functional ap-
proaches to vagueness as possibility and necessity functions with respect to
partial or Kleene logic approaches to incomplete information. Besides, we have
highlighted the difference in expressive power between partial model approaches
and the use of general epistemic sets for handling incomplete information.
Finally, we have described various natural orderings and aggregation oper-
ations in the three-valued setting, in terms of orthopairs and Boolean valua-
tion pairs. We have shown that some of these aggregations, expressed on the
three-valued truth-set are actually known in the literature. The systematic as-
sumption that knowledge pertains to individual variables has led to asymmetric
ordering relations where positive and negative literals do not play the same role
(as in logic programming, or logic-based diagnosis). As a consequence these
polarity-sensitive orderings between partial models as well as the aggregation
operations they induce make sense for partial models but no so much for general
epistemic sets, where positive literals do not play a specific role.
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Hopefully, the landscape offered in this paper will contribute to bridging
the gap between various communities (databases, logic programming, epistemic
logic, possibilistic logic, vagueness) that use different languages for handling
similar issues in the modeling of vague predicates or incomplete information.
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